This article considers the parameters that govern the categorisation, conceptualisation and judgement of "offense" in art, and so the limits of artistic freedom. Taking a legal and internationally informed perspective, the paper charts the establishment of conventional views on artistic expression and its assumed impact on the public or "community". It questions the conceptual accuracy of legal assumptions on the nature of art, as of the nature of expression and its impact. With reference to key cases and legal rulings, the article, while invested primarily in a forensic explication of the law and its phraseology, argues that all legal limitations on artistic expression embody assumptions that are paradoxical.
And whosoever shall offend one of these little ones that believe in me, it is better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and he were cast into the sea Mark 9:42-50 King James Version (KJV) Is it really the 'common citizen' who should dictate what is and what is not acceptable in the sophisticated field of art? Or should we rather teach the general public new art conventions and trends by challenging traditional taste and habits? After all, if we really and seriously treat the 'community standard test' as decisive, we may end up with the conclusion that we cannot go any further but keep on admiring Hogarth's The Graham Children (1742) in London's National Portrait Gallery.
In spite of that, courts from different jurisdictions (e.g. the USA, India, Romania, the Russian Federation or Japan) continue to apply the 'community standard [or tolerance] test' in order to delimitate the scope of freedom of artistic expression. In some other states, the applicability of this test in cases concerning freedom of artistic expression has been disqualified either explicitly (Canada) or implicitly (Colombia) . This text focuses on whether the community standard test is applicable at all to cases where freedom of artistic expression is at stake.
What is artistic expression?
Defining what is freedom of artistic expression (hereafter referred to as 'FAE') implies establishing, firstly, what is meant by 'artistic expression'. Farida Shaheed, the first UN Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, declared in her 2013 Report on the right to freedom of artistic expression and creativity that she had no intention 'to propose a definition of art' 1 . Similarly, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht held in the now famous Anachronistischer Zug case decision, that construing the definition of art [which is the notion employed in Article 5. Whilst the right to freedom of expression 'shall include' or 'includes' the freedom to 'seek', to 'receive' and to 'impart' 'information' and 'ideas', it may also include other things. The external manifestation of the human personality may take very different forms which cannot all be made to fit into the categories mentioned above.
Finally, the Canadian Supreme Court held in Sharpe 11

:
What may reasonably be viewed as art is admittedly a difficult question -one that philosophers have pondered through the ages. [...] The question of whether a particular drawing, film or text is art must be left to the trial judge to determine on the basis of a variety of factors. The subjective intention of the creator will be relevant, although it is unlikely to be conclusive. The form and content of the work may provide evidence as to whether it is art. Its connections with artistic conventions, traditions or styles may also be a factor. The opinion of experts on the subject may be helpful. Other factors, like the mode of production, display and distribution, may shed light on whether the depiction or writing possesses artistic value. It may be, as the case law develops, that the factors to be considered will be refined'.
Without in fact entering into a judicial dialogue with each other, these authorities seem to have reached similar conclusions, namely that art (artistic expression) is a medium for expression of inseparable combination of conscious and netamente íntimo, no admite restricción alguna, aparte de las limitaciones naturales que la técnica escogida le imponga al artista, y las fronteras de su propia capacidad para convertir en realidad material lo que previamente existe sólo en su imaginación'. Is any community standard applicable to transgressive and ever-changing phenomenon of art?
Once we established what is 'artistic expression' and 'community standard test' we can now address the question of whether a 'community standard test' is applicable to 'artistic expression'. More precisely put, the question arises whether 'community standard' or 'community tolerance' may define boundaries of FAE at all. The answer proposed in this work is obviously: No. Let us explain why.
Before we present our standpoint, we will first defend our position by proving that we are not isolated in our approach. The Canadian Supreme Court dealt with the problem of 'community tolerance standard' in Sharpe
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. One cannot but note that it was a very sensitive case where the defendant claimed that distribution of child pornography should be unpunished since he was under the protection of the artistic merit defence. One of the questions addressed by the Supreme Court was whether the artistic merit defence imports a requirement that material must comport with community standards in the sense of not posing a risk of harm to children 25 (one should note a very specific, narrow understanding of the community tolerance standard). Chief Justice McLachlin who drafted the majority opinion held:
I am not persuaded that we should read a community standards qualification into the defence. To do so would involve reading in a qualification that Parliament has not stated. Further, reading in the qualification of conformity with community standards would run counter to the logic of the defence, namely that artistic merit outweighs any harm that might result from the sexual representations of children in the work. Most material caught by the definition of child pornography could pose a potential risk of harm to children. To restrict the artistic merit defence to material posing no risk of harm to children would defeat the purpose of the defence. Parliament clearly intended that some pornographic and possibly harmful works would escape prosecution on the basis of this defence; otherwise there is no need for it.
In other words, the Canadian Supreme Court actually accepted that artistic work encompassing pictures of child pornography is allowed to pose risk of harm to the most vulnerable members of the community (children) but nevertheless still be protected under the artistic merit defense. It means that in their view artistic value of the disputed work is capable of outweighing possible harm to the community simply because it presents a greater value of itself.
A similar (or maybe even stricter) approach was proposed by the Colombian Constitutional Court in Castro Daza 26 where the Court simply held that assessing art must be left for individual viewers who, however, cannot expect the state to prohibit the distribution of a certain work of art and that is because of the pluralism on which the 25 This approach was previously adopted in Ontario (Attorney General) v. Langer (1995) Obviously, it is not only art specialists who visit art galleries, museums, theatres or independent cinemas (e.g. sometimes specialists invite some friends). So, average persons may happen to be accidentally exposed to the 'wickedness' of art. But if they are, are they really average members of community? Certainly not the community of those associating themselves with art, because in such a group the proportions of those sophisticated art consumers and average persons are inversed if compared to the whole society. It brings us to the conclusion that since average were painted on the spot -in accordance with the aims of the exhibition, which was meant to be spontaneous -and the general public had free access to them, as the organisers had not imposed any admission charge or any age-limit. Indeed, the paintings were displayed in an exhibition which was unrestrictedly open to -and sought to attract -the public at large. 
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, in each of them holding that artistic expressions 'appeal generally to a relatively narrow public', which must be reflected in the test of 'necessity in a democratic society'. However, never did the ECtHR explicitly state that it applied a sort of community standard test à rebours -by which we mean that proportions of individuals less and more tolerant towards the challenging nature of art, its transgression and ever-changing character, are different in the group of those actually confronting themselves with art than in the society as a whole.
But there is another argument against juxtaposing FAE with assumed feelings and reactions ofexcusez le mot -the common (citizens . And finally, if modern art is challenging today by proposing tomorrow, can we -at all -confront it with the perception of the contemporary general public? It does not seem plausible.
Conclusions
Searching for definitions of artistic expression exposes a lawyer to criticism from those assuming that art, as an autopoietic system and a constantly transgressing phenomenon, does not subject itself to normative classifications. Nevertheless, certain judicial authorities -characteristically from jurisdictions attached to FAE -endeavor to develop their definitions. Although they do not engage in judicial dialogue, their propositions are quite similar in that they suggest that art is an inseparable combination of conscious and unconscious elements of manifestation of human personality in its most intimate dimension.
In cases concerning FAE references to community standards (or community tolerance) test are universally widespread reaching from Japan and Russia via Romania to the United States. This test is based on the assumed (perceived by a judge) reaction of average person to the work of art. This approach can be criticized for three reasons. 
